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Abstract In this paper, we develop a bi-level human migration model using the 
concepts of affective engineering (Kansei Engineering) and conjectural variations 
equilibrium (CVE). In contrast to previous existing works, we develop a bi-level 
programming model in a natural form. The upper level agents are municipalities 
of competing locations, whose strategies are investments into the infrastructures 
of the locations (cities, towns, etc.). These investments aim at making the loca-
tions more attractive for both residents and potential migrants from other loca-
tions, which clearly demands affective engineering tools. At the lower level of 
the model, the present residents (grouped into professional communities) are also 
potential migrants to other locations. They make their decision where to migrate 
(if at all) by comparing the expected values of the utility functions of the outbound 
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and inbound locations, estimated by taking into account their group’s conjectures 
concerning equilibrium migration flows between the involved locations. The util-
ity functions reflect the affective engineering technique because their values are 
based on the potential migrants’ affection to the target locations. Applying a spe-
cial technique to verify the consistency of the conjectures (influence coefficients), 
the existence and uniqueness results for the consistent conjectural variations equi-
librium (CCVE) are established.
Keywords  Bi-level human migration model  •  Kansei (Affection) utility functions  • 
Variational  inequality  formulation  •  Consistency criterion  •  Consistent conjectural 
variations equilibrium
1  Introduction
Migration problems have been actively studied in many countries throughout the 
world, as the information/migration prediction data are extremely useful on a large 
economic scale. Migration prediction data can stipulate development of facilities 
necessary to advance employment, education, and ecology. Reciprocally, locations 
with more advanced infrastructure, higher employment capacities, ecologically 
friendly environments, etc., can generate the affection of the inhabitants and thus 
attract more potential migrants. However, overloaded housing/infrastructure facili-
ties may reduce the comfort in everyday life, thus contradicting the Kansei engi-
neering principles. Therefore, one can expect a trade-off in the investments into a 
locations infrastructure, balanced at a conjectural variations equilibrium state.
Various migration theories have been developed over time. In a shorter histori-
cal aspect, however, one may rely on the excellent fundamental survey Akkoyunlu 
and Vickerman [1].
In the works by Bulavsky and Kalashnikov [2, 3], a new array of conjectural 
variations equilibria (CVE) was introduced and investigated in which the influence 
coefficients of each agent affected the structure of the Nash equilibrium. In particu-
lar, constant conjectural influence factors were used in the human migration model 
examined in [4]. More precisely, the potential migration groups were taking into 
account not only the current difference between the utility function values at the 
destination and original locations but also the possible variations in the utility val-
ues implied by the change of population volume due to the migration flows. These 
conjectured variations could be described with an aid of the so-called influence 
coefficients. In other words, we did not consider a perfect competition but rather a 
generalized Cournot-type model (in contrast to the classic Cournot model).
In their previous papers [5, 6], the authors extended the latter model to the case 
where the conjectural variation coefficients may not only be constants but also 
functions of the total population at the destination and of the group’s fraction in it. 
Moreover, we allow these functions to take distinct values at the abandoned location 
and at the destination, which should elevate the models flexibility. As an experimental 
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verification of the proposed model, we developed a specific form of the model based 
upon relevant population data of a three-city agglomeration at the boundary of two 
Mexican states: Durango (Dgo.) and Coahuila (Coah.). Specifically, we considered 
the 1980–2005 dynamics of population growth in three cities—Torreón (Coah.), 
Gómez Palacio (Dgo.), and Lerdo (Dgo.)—and proposed utility functions of three 
various types for each of the three cities. To our knowledge, these types of util-
ity functions were not used in previous literature dealing with the human migration 
model. After collecting the necessary information about the average movement and 
transportation (i.e., migration) costs for each pair of cities, we applied the above-men-
tioned human migration model to this example. Numerical experiments were con-
ducted, with interesting results concerning the probable equilibrium states.
The novel approach of the recent paper by Kalashnikov et al. [7] lies in the pro-
posed definitions of consistent conjectures and in the outskirt of possible ways to 
calculate the consistent conjectures and the related consistent conjectural variation 
equilibrium state (CCVES).
Motivated by the ideas of bi-level structures of migration processes (the upper 
level competition among municipalities and the lower level equilibrium among the 
potential migrants), we proposed a new (bi-level) formulation of the human migra-
tion model. Under general enough assumptions, we also proved the existence of 
solutions to the bi-level program. The results of the numerical experiments (which 
are still underway) will only be outlined.
Sections 2 and 3, in primarily following the previous papers by Kalashnikov et 
al. [5, 6] and Kalashnikov et al. [7], describe the proposed bi-level human migra-
tion model, define the conjectural variation equilibrium at the lower level, and cite 
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 from [5, 6], which establish the existence and uniqueness of 
the lower level equilibrium as a solution of an appropriate variational inequality 
problem. The consistency of the conjectures and the existence of the correspond-
ing bi-level equilibrium are discussed in Sect. 4. In contrast to the previous paper 
[8], here we extend the lower lever (and thus, also the upper level) utility functions 
from linear to quadratic ones. The conclusions (Sect. 5), acknowledgments, and 
the list of references complete the paper.
2  Problem Statement and Preliminaries
Similar to [4–6], consider a closed economy with:
•	 n locations, denoted by i;
•	 K classes of population, denoted by k;
•	 Q¯ki  initial fixed population of class k in location i;
•	 Qik final population of class k in location i;
•	 skij migration flow of class k from origin i to destination j;
•	 ckij
(
skij
)
= bkijskij +
1
2 a
k
ij
(
skij
)2
 migration cost for residents from group k moving 
from location i to location j.
30 V. V. Kalashnikov et al.
Assume that the migration cost reflects not only the cost of physical movement but 
also the personal and psychological (affection) cost as perceived by a class when 
moving between locations. The utility uik (attractiveness of location i as perceived 
by class k) depends on the population at destination, that is, uik = uik(Qik). This 
assumption is quite natural: indeed, in many cases, the cities with higher popu-
lation provide much more possibilities to find a job, better medical service and 
household facilities, a developed infrastructure, etc., which is readily described by 
the principles of Kansei Engineering. On the other hand, when the infrastructure 
development lags behind the modern city demands, the higher population may 
lead to certain decrease in the living standards, in the inhabitants’ affection to their 
place, and hence, of the affection utility values.
These affection utility functions also incorporate parameters reflecting the scale 
of investments made by the location’s authorities in order to improve the infrastruc-
ture, employment capacities, household construction, power supply, and so on, based 
upon the principles of Kansei Engineering. Exactly these amounts of investment 
play the role of the municipality strategies in the game at the upper level.
First, we describe the lower level problem. The conservation of flow equations, 
given for each class k and each location i, and the inequalities forbidding repeated 
or chain migration are listed below:
and
with skij ≥ 0, ∀k = 1, . . . , K; j �= i. Denote the problem’s feasible set by
Equation (1) states that the population of class k at location i is determined by the 
initial population of class k at location i plus the migration flow into i of that class 
minus the migration flow out of i for the same class. Equation (2) postulates that 
the flow out of i by migrants of group k cannot exceed the initial population of 
group k at i, because no chain migration is allowed in this model.
Assume that the migrants are rational and affection-motivated and that migra-
tion continues until no individual has any affection to the target location and thus 
any incentive to move, since a unilateral decision will no longer yield a positive 
net gain (the gain in the expected affection utility value minus the migration cost).
In order to extend the human migration model from [4], here we introduce the 
following concepts.
Definition 1 Let wk+ij ≥ 0 be an influence coefficient taken in account by an indi-
vidual of class k considering a possibility of moving from i to j. This coefficient is 
defined by his/her assumption that after the movement of skij individuals of class k 
from i to j the total population of class k at j equals:
(1)Q
k
i = Q¯ki +
∑
j �=i
skji −
∑
j �=i
skij, i = 1, . . . , n,
(2)
∑
j �=i
skij ≤ Q¯ki , i = 1, . . . , n,
(3)M = {(Q, s)| s ≥ 0, (Q, s) satisfies (1) − (2)}.
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At the same time, let wk−ij ≥ 0 be an influence coefficient conjectured by an indi-
vidual of group k planning to move from i to j, determined by the assumption that 
after the movement of sijk individuals, the total population of class k in i will remain
We accept the following assumptions concerning the affection utility functions and 
expected variations in the utility values:
A1. The affection utility uki = uki
(Qki ) is a monotone decreasing and continu-
ously differentiable function.
A2. Each person of group k, when considering his/her possibility of moving from 
location i to location j, takes into account not only the difference in the affec-
tion utility values at the initial location and the destination, but also both the 
expected (negative) increment of the affection value at the destination j:
and the expected (positive) affection utility value increment in the abandoned loca-
tion i:
3  Definition of Equilibrium
In this section, we will define what we understand as the conjectural variations equi-
librium (CVE) both at the lower and the upper level of the new migration model.
3.1  Definition of Equilibrium at the Lower Level
At the lower level, we use the same concept of CVE as defined in our previous 
works [5–7].
Definition 2 A multiclass population and flow pattern (Q∗, s∗) ∈ M are the equi-
librium at the lower level, if for each class k = 1, . . . , K, and for every pair of 
locations (i, j), i, j = 1, . . . , n; i �= j, the following relationships hold:
(4)Q¯kj + wk+ij skij.
(5)Q¯ki − wk−ij skij.
(6)s
k
ijw
k+
ij
∂ukj
∂Qkj
,
(7)−skijwk−ij
∂uki
∂Qki
.
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and
   ⃞
In order to proceed with the equilibrium existence and uniqueness results, we 
need an extra assumption to hold.
A3. We assume that the influence coefficients are functions depending upon the 
current population at the location in question and the migration flow from 
location i to location j, satisfying the following conditions:
and
where
Taking into account assumption A3 and omitting for shortness the argument Q* in 
the utility functions, we turn (8) into:
and
Assume that the affection utility function associated with a particular location and 
a single class can depend upon the population associated with every class and each 
location, that is, compose a vector-function u = u(Q). Also suppose that the cost 
(8)
uki − s
k∗
ij w
k−
ij
∂uki
∂Qki
(Q∗) + bkij + akijsk∗ij


= ukj + s
k∗
ij w
k+
ij
∂ukj
∂Qkj
(Q∗) − ki , if sk∗ij > 0;
≥ ukj + s
k∗
ij w
k+
ij
∂ukj
∂Qkj
(Q∗) − ki , if sk∗ij = 0;
(9)ki


≥ 0, if
�
ℓ�=i
sk∗ij = Q¯ki ;
= 0, if
�
ℓ�=i
sk∗ij < Q¯ki .
(10)skijwk+ij (Q, s) = vk+ij skij + σ k+ij Qkj ,
(11)skijwk−ij (Q, s) = vk−ij skij + σ k−ij Qki ,
(12)vk±ij ≥ 0, σ k±ij ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , K; i �= j.
(13)
uki − s
k∗
ij v
k−
ij
∂uki
∂Qki
+ σ k−ij Qk∗i
∂uki
∂Qki
+ bkij + a
k
ijs
k∗
ij = u
k
j + s
k∗
ij v
k+
ij
∂ukj
∂Qkj
+ σ k+ij Qk∗j
∂ukj
∂Qkj
− ki ,
if sk∗ij > 0;
(14)
uki − s
k∗
ij v
k−
ij
∂uki
∂Qki
+ σ k−ij Qk∗i
∂uki
∂Qki
+ bkij + a
k
ijs
k∗
ij ≥ u
k
j + s
k∗
ij v
k+
ij
∂ukj
∂Qkj
+ σ k+ij Qk∗j
∂ukj
∂Qkj
− ki ,
if sk∗ij = 0.
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associated with migration between two locations as perceived by a particular class 
can depend, in general, upon the flow of each class between every pair of loca-
tions, i.e., compose an aggregate vector-function c = c(s). Finally, let us form an 
auxiliary vector of the appropriate size as follows:
where
Now, we are in a position to formulate the following result established in the pre-
vious papers [5, 6]:
Theorem 1  A population and migration flow pattern satisfy the equilibrium con-
ditions (8) and (9) if, and only if it solve the variational inequality problem
   ⃞
The existence of at least one solution to the variational inequality (17) follows 
from the general theory of variational inequalities, under the sole assumption of 
continuous differentiability of the utility functions u and continuity of migration 
cost functions c, since the feasible convex set M is compact (cf., for example, 
Kinderlehrer and Stampacchia [9]).
From now on, we omit the superscript k for simplicity purpose. The uniqueness 
of the equilibrium population and migration flow pattern (Q*, s*) follows under the 
assumption that the compound operator
involving the utility and migration cost functions, is strictly monotone over the 
feasible set M:
that is,
(15)d(Q, s) :=
(
dkij(Q, s)
)
,
(16)dkij(Q, s) := skijvk−ij
∂uki
∂Qki
− σ k−ij Qki
∂uki
∂Qki
+ skijv
k+
ij
∂ukj
∂Qkj
+ σ k+ij Qkj
∂ukj
∂Qkj
.
(17)〈−u(Q∗), Q − Q∗〉 + 〈c(s∗) − d(Q∗, s∗), s − s∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀(Q, s) ∈ M.
(18)
(
−u(Q)
c(s) − d(Q, s)
)
: RK×n × RK×n×(n−1) → RK×n × RK×n×(n−1),
(19)
〈(
u
(Q1)
c
(
s1
)
− d
(Q1, s1)
)
−
(
−u
(Q2)
c
(
s2
)
− d
(Q2, s2)
)
,
( Q1 − Q2
s1 − s2
)〉
> 0,
∀
( Q1
s1
)
�=
( Q2
s2
)
,
(20)
−
〈
u
(
Q1
)
− u
(
Q2
)
, Q1 − Q2
〉
+
〈
c
(
s1
)
− c
(
s2
)
, s1 − s2
〉
−
〈
d
(
Q1, s1
)
− d
(
Q2, s2
)
, s1 − s2
〉
> 0, ∀
( Q1
s1
)
�=
( Q2
s2
)
.
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The latter is a consequence of the following classical result of the Theory of 
Variational Inequality Problems (see, for example, Kinderlehrer and Stampacchia [8]):
Theorem 2 Consider the variational inequality: Find a y∗ ∈ M ⊂ Rm such that,
If the operator F : Rm → Rm is strictly monotone over M, that is,
then the variational inequality (21) has at most one solution.  ⃞
Having established the existence and uniqueness of the (lower level) equilib-
rium among the potential migrants, we may pass to the concept of the upper level 
equilibrium among the municipal authorities.
3.2  Definition of Equilibrium at the Upper Level
We assume that the affection utility function associated with location i and class k 
of potential migrants has the form (which is an extension of the linear utility func-
tion used in the previous work [8])
where Aki > 0, Bki > 0, βki > 0 are parameters related to the environment facili-
ties for the potential immigrants of group k in location i. For instance, the eco-
nomical sense of Aik could be the average cost of a household in location i in a 
district where the typical representatives of class k prefer to settle down, while Bik 
might be interpreted as an inverse affection coefficient for the immigrants of group 
k: that is, the lower the value of Bki , the higher the degree of affection revealed by 
the average family of the specimen of class k to the growing population of loca-
tion i. Finally, the parameter Ri reflects the amount of investment by the authorities 
of location i into the improvement in the environment for the newcomers and the 
regular inhabitants: The higher the invested amount, the lower the negative effect 
of the growing population on the location’s attractiveness and affection grade for 
both the current and potential inhabitants.
Now supposing that the investment volumes Ri > 0 are used as strategies of the 
players (municipal authorities of the locations involved), it is standard to define an 
equilibrium state in the (upper level) game.
Definition 3 An investment vector R∗ =
(
R∗1, . . . , R
∗
n
)
 is called the equilibrium 
at the upper level if for any location i, i = 1, . . . , nc, the municipal authority’s 
(21)
〈
F
(
y∗
)
, y − y∗
〉
≥ 0, ∀y ∈ M.
(22)
〈
F
(
y1
)
− F
(
y2
)
, y1 − y2
〉
> 0, ∀y1, y2 ∈ M, y1 �= y2,
(23)uki
(
Qki
)
= Aki −
Bki
Ri
Qki − βki
(
Qki
)2
,
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utility function Ui = Ui
(
Ri, R∗−i
)
 attains its maximum value exactly at Ri = R∗i , if 
it is assumed that all the rest of the players are stuck to their investment values 
R∗−i =
(
R∗1, . . . , R
∗
i−1, R
∗
i+1, . . . , R
∗
n
)
. Here, the municipality affection utility func-
tion Ui = Ui(R) is the weighted sum of the location’s utility functions of all the 
classes of potential migrants determined below:
where Q* is the equilibrium of the lower level population values, which (due to 
Theorems 3.1 and 3.1) exists uniquely for any (fixed) vector of investments R 
involved into the structure of locations’ affection utility functions (23).  ⃞
4  Existence of a Bi-level Equilibrium with Consistent 
Conjectures
The consistency of conjectures (or, the influence coefficients) arises naturally as 
an important issue. Indeed, the existence of at least one equilibrium for arbitrary 
influence coefficients obliges one to select some justified conjectures so that the 
above concept of the equilibrium make sense. In this section, we propose a con-
cept of consistency and formulate the existence result for the consistent conjec-
tural variations equilibrium (CCEV).
Based upon the consistency criterion proposed in [10], we formulate the following 
definition. Here, for simplicity, we recall our assumption that the affection utility func-
tion for each location i and every potential migrant group k are quadratic of the form 
uki
(Qki ) = Aki − BkiRi Qi − βki (Qki )2, with Aki > 0, Bki > 0, Ri > 0, βki > 0; next,
akij > 0 for each quadratic migration cost function; and finally, conjectures 
(influence coefficients) are constant with zero elasticity, i.e., σ k,±ij = 0, and 
vk+ij = v
k−
ij = v
k
ij > 0, for all i, j, k.
Definition 4 At a lower level equilibrium (LLE) pattern (Q∗, s∗) ∈ M, the influence 
coefficients vkij ≡ wkij
Bkj
Rj , k = 1, . . . , K; i, j = 1, . . . , n; i �= j, are referred to as 
consistent, if the following equalities hold:
The LLE with consistent conjectures is called a consistent conjectural variations 
equilibrium state (CCVES) in application to the above-described human migration 
model. ⃞
(24)Ui(R) := Q
1∗
i
Q∗i
u1i
(Q∗) + · · · + QK∗iQ∗i uKi
(Q∗),
(25)
wkij =
1
2
Bkj
Rjβkj
+
∑
ℓ�=j
ℓ�=k
1
wkℓj+
ak
ℓjRj
Bkj
.
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Now, we are in a position to formulate the following existence result.
Theorem 3 Under assumptions A1, A2, and A3, and if all the investment sums 
are bounded (i.e., 0 < Ri ≤ R, i = 1, . . . , n), then there exists a consistent con-
jectural equilibrium state (CCVES) in application to the above-described bi-level 
human migration model.  ⃞
When proving Theorem 4, we established that certain infinite-dimensional map-
pings involved in Eq. (4) are continuous and contracting over corresponding com-
pact subsets. This allows one to find, for each fixed group k of potential migrant 
and each destination location j, good approximations for the consistent conjectures 
(influence coefficients) vkij ≡ wkij
Bkj
Rj , k = 1, . . . , K; i, j = 1, . . . , n; i �= j, by applying
a simple iteration procedure:
with wk,(0)ij = 0, k = 1, . . . , K; i, j = 1, . . . , n; i �= j.
The convergence of process (26) is established in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 For each fixed group k of potential migrants and every pair location-
destination (i,j), i �= j, the approximate conjectures (influence coefficients) obtained 
by formulas (26) converge (as m → ∞) to the unique solution of system (25).  ⃞
In our future research, we are going to extend the obtained results to the case of 
not necessarily quadratic affection utility functions and discontinuous conjectures 
(influence coefficients). However, some of the necessary technique can be devel-
oped now, in the case of quadratic utilities and continuous conjectures. To do that, 
for fixed values of k and j, we denote the value of the inverse of the derivative of 
the affection utility function by
and rewrite the consistency equalities (25) in a more general form:
where τ ∈ (−∞, 0]. When τ → −∞, then the solution of system (28) tends to the 
unique limit solution vkij ≡ wkij
Bkj
Rj = 1, k = 1, . . . , K; i, j = 1, . . . , n; i �= j. In other 
words, for all the finite values of the parameter τ ≤ 0, we can prove the following result.
(26)
w
k,(m+1)
ij =
1
2
Bkj
Rjβkj
+
∑
ℓ�=j
ℓ�=i
1
w
k,(m)
ℓj +
ak
ℓjRj
Bkj
, m = 0, 1, . . . ,
(27)τ :=
[
dukj
dQkj
(
Qkj
)]−1
< 0,
(28)w
k
ij =
1
− 2
τβkj
+
∑
ℓ�=j
ℓ�=i
1
wkℓj−τa
k
ℓj
,
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Theorem 5 For each fixed group k of potential migrants and every pair location-
destination (i, j), i �= j, and for any τ ∈ (−∞, 0], there exists a unique solution of 
Eq. (28) as a collection of continuous functions wkij = wkij(τ ), i, j = 1, . . . , n; i �= j. 
Furthermore, wkij(0) = 0, and vkij(τ ) ≡ wkij(τ )
Bkj
Rj → 1 as τ → −∞, for all 
i, j = 1, . . . , n; i �= j ⃞
5  Conclusions and Future Research
We investigated a human migration model based upon Kansei engineering principles 
and involving conjectures of the migration groups concerning the variations in the 
affection utility function values, both in the abandoned location and in the destination 
site. To formulate equilibrium conditions for this model, we used the concept of conjec-
tural variation equilibrium (CVE). We established the existence and uniqueness results 
for the equilibrium in question, and introduced a concept of consistent conjectures 
(influence coefficients) together with the corresponding CVEs. The theorem guarantee-
ing the existence and uniqueness of a solution to each consistency system, and there-
fore the consistent conjectural variation equilibrium state (CCVES), was also proven.
We also notice that the human migration model with conjectural variations can 
be further extended and examined in the case when constraint (2) is replaced by a 
weaker condition, as in
which allows us to consider the repeated or chain migration. In this case, the fea-
sible set M ceases to be compact (remaining, however, convex), which makes the 
use of the general theory of variational inequality problems insufficient to demon-
strate the existence of equilibrium. Then, subtler results obtained in Bulavsky et al. 
[11] and further developed in Isac et al. [4] can be used instead. Indeed, the exist-
ence of equilibrium will be guaranteed for various classes of affective utility func-
tions and migration costs that are free of exceptional families of elements (EFE).
Acknowledgements The first author’s research activities were financially supported by the 
R&D Department (Cátedra de Investigación) CAT-174 of the Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios 
Superiores de Monterrey (ITESM), Campus Monterrey, and by the SEP-CONACYT grant CB-
2008-01-106664, Mexico. The second and the fourth authors were also supported by the SEP-
CONACyT grant CB-2009-01-127691 and the PAICYT project CE250-09, Mexico. The fourth 
author was supported by the SEP-CONACyT grant CB-2011-11-169765.
References
 1. Akkoyunlu S, Vickerman R (2001) Migration and the efficiency of European labour markets. 
Working Paper, Department of Economics, The University of Kent at Canterbury
 2. Bulavsky VA, Kalashnikov VV (1994) One-parametric driving method to study equilibrium. 
Econ Math Methods (Ekonomika i Matematicheskie Metody, in Russian) 30(2):129–138
(29)Qki ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n; k = 1, . . . , K ,
38 V. V. Kalashnikov et al.
 3. Bulavsky VA, Kalashnikov VV (1995) Equilibria in generalized Cournot and Stackelberg models. 
Econ Math Methods (Ekonomika i Matematicheskie Metody, in Russian) 31(3):164–176
 4. Isac G, Bulavsky VA, Kalashnikov VV (2002) Complementarity, equilibrium, efficiency and 
economics. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht
 5. Kalashnikov VV, Kalashnykova NI, Luévanos R, Uranga C, Méndez M, Luévanos A (2007) 
Un modelo de migración humana: Experimentos numéricos basados sobre los datos de las 
tres ciudades Laguneras. Estudios Demográficos y Urbanos 22(3):731–760
 6. Kalashnikov VV, Kalashnykova NI, Luévanos R, Uranga C, Méndez M, Luévanos A 
(2008) Numerical experimentation with a human migration model. European J Oper Res 
189(1):208–229
 7. Kalashnikov VV, Kalashnykova NI, Chávez Delgadillo LR (2011) Consistent conjectures in a 
human migration model: definition, existence and computation. Int J Innovative Comput Inf 
Control 7(4):1949–1957
 8. Kalashnikov VV, Kalashnykova NI, Alcorta García MA, Acosta Sánchez YG, KalashnikovVV 
Jr (2012) Consistent conjectural variations equilibrium in a bilevel human migrationmodel. Int 
Bus Eco Res J 11(2):195–204
 9. Kinderlehrer D, Stampacchia G (1980) An introduction to variational inequalities and their 
applications. Academic Press, New York
 10. Kalashnikov VV, Bulavsky VA, Kalashnykova NI, Castillo FJ (2011) Mixed oligopoly with 
consistent conjectures. European J Oper Res 210(3):729–735
 11. Bulavsky VA, Isac G, Kalashnikov VA (1998) Application of topological degree theory to 
complementarity problems. In: Migdalas A et al (eds) Multilevel optimization: algorithms 
and applications. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp 333–358
